Yesterday, when I talked to a friend of mine on China's nationalism, I said that the strong sense of national pride, achieved by compromising or undermining individual citizen's rights can't be called patriotism. Some of my friends prefer the word 'patriotism' to avoid negative connotation of 'nationalism', which in my view is just self-cheating. Actually, such a strong sense of national pride held by the most of Chinese, which in general is disproportionate to the development of civil society in China, is a worrisome sign.
China's strong sense of national pride after the Olympics might play a very important role in re-instating the sense of western nationalism if the development of civil society in China fails to eliminate doubts from the outside world. The division of the Self and the Other at the national level has never been so prominent since the end of the cold war. Coincidentally, Russia now might be another important factor in shaping western nationalism, especially after its invasion of Georgia, as conservative Robert Kagan argues in his recent essay that 'nationalism, and the nation itself, far from being weakened by globalization, has returned with a vengeance'.
The tricky thing is such a western nationalism is always a latent one, hidden behind universal values with the aim to differentiate You and Me, like Kagan's democracy vs. autocracy, but when one looks into the argument one would find what's really important to him is actually power play.
I think any argument tinged with such a mentality of the national power play, in the name of defending democracy, is a kind of nationalism, because it hijacks the universal notion - democracy to serve the writer's national interests, presumably western. It is for this reason that I'm very suspicious about Kagan's divisive thinking, as it might fanfare confrontation instead of promoting peace.
I'm not so sure what Kristof's view is about Kagan's history-is-back (I myself agree that history is back, but not in a sense of Kagan's argument about democracy vs. autocracy), and I'm not very comfortable either about his way of argument in his latest essay on China's rise. I even think he might fall into the trap of western nationalism by saying 'now it will be our turn to scramble to compete with a rising Asia'.
Does he? Granted that China's success so far in its development lies largely in its flexibility to cope with pressures either from the outside or from the inside, but the standpoint of Kristof is quite ambiguous. In fact, one can sense a bit his conservative undertone by playing up the rise of China, which nevertheless underlies his strong identification with the US (patriotic feeling as he may argue) instead of liberal values per se.
Interestingly, there is another critique from Gulf News by Amir Taheri, which sheds some insightful light on the similar concern about China after the Olympics. Instead of portraying China as a major competitor, threatening to gain more from other nations' existing interests in a zero sum game, Taheri poses questions rather from internal problems that China is currently facing without the reference to his own country. In a very concise way, Taheri touches three urgent issues that largely would shape the future of China.
The first one is the political reform,
'The Chinese ruling elite is divided between reformists and supporters of the status quo ante. Portraits of the Great Helmsman may have disappeared from public view for the duration of the games. But a good chunk of the elite, still drunk on the heady wine of Maoism, is biding its time. The final purge, both in terms of policy and personnel, has not yet taken place.'
The second one is the concern about China's role in the international arena,
'the international system needs a positive input from China. A policy of nay-saying and prevarication cannot deal with dangers, such as nuclear proliferation spearheaded by North Korea and Iran, that could ultimately affect China’s own security.'
And the third one is how to assimilate so large amount of migrant workers in Chinese society into a stable social stratum,
'The 300 million or so poverty stricken seasonal workers roaming from one end of the country to another could emerge as a veritable human tsunami, destroying all that China has built since the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping a generation ago.'
The analysis is insightful, problems are better articulated, and the questions posed by the writer are sharper. Sorry, Mr. Kristof, it is such a vigorous thinking without too much concern of the self-interest sets up the standard. Instead of some shallow cliches with the tone of nationalism, be it eastern or western, such an insightful argument is in need now. Quality matters!
Showing posts with label civil society. Show all posts
Showing posts with label civil society. Show all posts
8/21/2008
8/20/2008
Legal problems of protest
Here is the story of a brave lawyer who are against all odds to pursue his ideal. Another story tells about two elderly women, who had some problems in settling down the compensation fee with the real estate developer for the demolition of their old houses, applied for the permission to protest in the specified zones by the local authority but only received ridiculous punishment. Sadly, it's impossible to look into the details of these two cases. So it's just for the reference here.
However, some Chinese legal experts do write up something on the protest issue. In his essay about citizen's rights to protest in China, Gao Yifei, a professor in Xiangtan University of Hunan province, elaborates the legal basis on the citizen's right to protest, particularly the historical context for the protest law passed in 1989. More importantly, he also points out that there are some flaws that need to be re-addressed in that law. For example, there is no clause in the current law to grant citizens the right to litigate the government to the People's Court if their applications are rejected by the government, which means under the current situation, if citizen's application is rejected by the government, he/she basically has no means to obtain further legal support. It's the dead end. Obviously, such a law is not sufficient to fully guarantee the citizen's right.
I must say it's a timely analysis which is very helpful to understand the issue of protest right. The problem is when lawmakers in China will write a bill to amend the current assembly and demonstration law.
However, some Chinese legal experts do write up something on the protest issue. In his essay about citizen's rights to protest in China, Gao Yifei, a professor in Xiangtan University of Hunan province, elaborates the legal basis on the citizen's right to protest, particularly the historical context for the protest law passed in 1989. More importantly, he also points out that there are some flaws that need to be re-addressed in that law. For example, there is no clause in the current law to grant citizens the right to litigate the government to the People's Court if their applications are rejected by the government, which means under the current situation, if citizen's application is rejected by the government, he/she basically has no means to obtain further legal support. It's the dead end. Obviously, such a law is not sufficient to fully guarantee the citizen's right.
I must say it's a timely analysis which is very helpful to understand the issue of protest right. The problem is when lawmakers in China will write a bill to amend the current assembly and demonstration law.
8/19/2008
Protest? You're Kidding.
I guess that foreign media's questioning about the quietness in all three protest zones in Beijing, which signifies the repressiveness of the authority, did have some effects. At least, the municipal PSB held a press conference, so we know that the number of applications for protests has totaled 77 since August 1.
Xinhua's report says issues like labour disputes, medicare disputes and welfare are involved in those applications, and they have been turned down 'because the problems those applicants contended for were properly addressed by relevant authorities or departments through consultations'.
No more details, but a story from IHT provides a glimpse on how difficult it is for an applicant to get through the procedure. I've read the adventure of NYT's columnist Nicholas Kristof the day before, but the one appeared on IHT is quite special since the protagonist is not a local resident but from Heilongjiang, a northeastern province of China. Gao's story is heart wrenching; the problem however, is complex. Unless he obtains the support at the local level, either through lawyers or through local media, his problem is quite impossible to solve by simply protesting in Beijing. This is really the vicious circle in China that a socially deprived person couldn't find a proper channel legally to solve his/her problem, and neither can he release the tension through local media's interference by playing the check-and-balance game or through the support from the civil society. When such a channel at the local level is blocked, people like Gao would come to Beijing and seek help. Such a mentality has its origin in the feudal era of China when the society is strictly conformed to the hierarchical structure without the respect of individual's human rights. Applying for the demonstration might be his last straw.
How typical is the case of Gao ? Among those who have applied for the protests, are there any Beijing residents? Reading the recent Pew's report on the Chinese attitude toward future, I'm surprised to know Chinese people's near universal optimism toward their future. I can't help wondering how relevant the case of Gao has become to those optimistic Chinese.
Putting my imagination of Mr. Gao and Mr. Optimist together, the sharp contrast is obvious. But I'm puzzled by the question who is more representative to the current China. Are they both representative? But if Mr. Gao is from the weak stratum, and not belonging to the group of Mr. Optimist, why the authority is still fearful to grant him the right to protest. Since more than 80% of Chinese are in the group of Mr. Optimist, such a solid social foundation should make the authority more confident to handle the case of Mr. Gao.
This is a typical case that harmony goes to extreme where it would damage itself. Because it's so quiet, it makes people wonder something must be wrong. And in such a wondering, something has been anticipated. And in such an anticipation, something really would happen. It's all become self-reflexive. Mr. Gao's story definitely would be ignored in the official post-Olympics narrative because it is simply against the image of the BOG it tries to project. However, this small leftover being recorded here could be a reminder afterwards, for me or for others to recuperate a bit reality when the passion for the OG runs out of its steam.
Xinhua's report says issues like labour disputes, medicare disputes and welfare are involved in those applications, and they have been turned down 'because the problems those applicants contended for were properly addressed by relevant authorities or departments through consultations'.
No more details, but a story from IHT provides a glimpse on how difficult it is for an applicant to get through the procedure. I've read the adventure of NYT's columnist Nicholas Kristof the day before, but the one appeared on IHT is quite special since the protagonist is not a local resident but from Heilongjiang, a northeastern province of China. Gao's story is heart wrenching; the problem however, is complex. Unless he obtains the support at the local level, either through lawyers or through local media, his problem is quite impossible to solve by simply protesting in Beijing. This is really the vicious circle in China that a socially deprived person couldn't find a proper channel legally to solve his/her problem, and neither can he release the tension through local media's interference by playing the check-and-balance game or through the support from the civil society. When such a channel at the local level is blocked, people like Gao would come to Beijing and seek help. Such a mentality has its origin in the feudal era of China when the society is strictly conformed to the hierarchical structure without the respect of individual's human rights. Applying for the demonstration might be his last straw.
How typical is the case of Gao ? Among those who have applied for the protests, are there any Beijing residents? Reading the recent Pew's report on the Chinese attitude toward future, I'm surprised to know Chinese people's near universal optimism toward their future. I can't help wondering how relevant the case of Gao has become to those optimistic Chinese.
Putting my imagination of Mr. Gao and Mr. Optimist together, the sharp contrast is obvious. But I'm puzzled by the question who is more representative to the current China. Are they both representative? But if Mr. Gao is from the weak stratum, and not belonging to the group of Mr. Optimist, why the authority is still fearful to grant him the right to protest. Since more than 80% of Chinese are in the group of Mr. Optimist, such a solid social foundation should make the authority more confident to handle the case of Mr. Gao.
This is a typical case that harmony goes to extreme where it would damage itself. Because it's so quiet, it makes people wonder something must be wrong. And in such a wondering, something has been anticipated. And in such an anticipation, something really would happen. It's all become self-reflexive. Mr. Gao's story definitely would be ignored in the official post-Olympics narrative because it is simply against the image of the BOG it tries to project. However, this small leftover being recorded here could be a reminder afterwards, for me or for others to recuperate a bit reality when the passion for the OG runs out of its steam.
8/17/2008
A test by Nicholas Kristof
Well, just wondering if there are any protestors in the three demonstration zones allocated by the local authority in Beijing for the Olympic Games, someone has already tested the application procedure! I read it here.
A rare account though, as it's quite impossible to have it in China. It's also funny to see the complementary video, in which the interior decoration of PSB tells itself on the cost (seems to me quite costly for these leather-like sofa). Can't imagine such a videoing would be allowed!
The Big Brother is really open this time. Isn't this the syndrome of the post-totalitarianism, in which certain things are allowed procedurally in the name of the rule of law, but the difficulties you are to encounter will just turn you down.
'Surrender!' That's how it goes in front of such a procedural barrier, as what Mr. Kristof did finally. Very nice try indeed.
A rare account though, as it's quite impossible to have it in China. It's also funny to see the complementary video, in which the interior decoration of PSB tells itself on the cost (seems to me quite costly for these leather-like sofa). Can't imagine such a videoing would be allowed!
The Big Brother is really open this time. Isn't this the syndrome of the post-totalitarianism, in which certain things are allowed procedurally in the name of the rule of law, but the difficulties you are to encounter will just turn you down.
'Surrender!' That's how it goes in front of such a procedural barrier, as what Mr. Kristof did finally. Very nice try indeed.
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